A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions

By collecting environmental data and by using an hermeneutical approach, this Article features the following working hypothesis: that the actions of modern States in the context of economic sanctions programs and imposition of sanctions by sender States against target States, either of unilateral or...

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Autor Principal: Téllez Núñez, Andrés
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Departamento de Derecho Constitucional 2018
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/5672
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recordtype ojs
institution Universidad Externado de Colombia
collection OJS
language Español (Spanish)
format Artículo (Article)
author Téllez Núñez, Andrés
spellingShingle Téllez Núñez, Andrés
A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
author_facet Téllez Núñez, Andrés
author_sort Téllez Núñez, Andrés
title A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
title_short A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
title_full A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
title_fullStr A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
title_full_unstemmed A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
title_sort look at how international law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions
description By collecting environmental data and by using an hermeneutical approach, this Article features the following working hypothesis: that the actions of modern States in the context of economic sanctions programs and imposition of sanctions by sender States against target States, either of unilateral or multilateral nature in the light of current international legal instruments, particularly the International Bill of Rights, upon being perused on the basis of two features, (a) what is sought, which is mainly seeking to change the behavior of any given State or government and (b) punishing a behavior that has been found by the sender State as wrong and illicit, observing at the same time the behavior of the sender State and the target State, the purpose of international law ends up relatively being materialized and the worlds of the ought and of the might although distinguishable in the planes of ideas, are ultimately mixed up. The idea underlying our main working hypothesis as to the imposition of economic sanctions which as their own name suggest have an extensive economic aspect, particularly when they are adopted by the United States, is that an apparent violation of international law actually shows the relative verification of its provisions and that law and politics are mixed up and inevitably intertwined. In that sense and contrary to what may be extensively suggested, public international law is complied with even if the imposition of economic sanctions as they are imposed today may suggest otherwise.
publisher Departamento de Derecho Constitucional
publishDate 2018
url https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/5672
_version_ 1705930876636889088
spelling ojs-article-56722021-07-13T12:43:50Z A look at how International Law is actually lived from the perspective of unilateral economic sanctions Una mirada a la vivencia del derecho internacional desde la perspectiva de las sanciones económicas unilaterales Téllez Núñez, Andrés Public International Law; economic sanctions; validity; ought; might; UN; Security Council Derecho internacional público; sanciones económicas; validez; deber ser; política; onu; Consejo de Seguridad By collecting environmental data and by using an hermeneutical approach, this Article features the following working hypothesis: that the actions of modern States in the context of economic sanctions programs and imposition of sanctions by sender States against target States, either of unilateral or multilateral nature in the light of current international legal instruments, particularly the International Bill of Rights, upon being perused on the basis of two features, (a) what is sought, which is mainly seeking to change the behavior of any given State or government and (b) punishing a behavior that has been found by the sender State as wrong and illicit, observing at the same time the behavior of the sender State and the target State, the purpose of international law ends up relatively being materialized and the worlds of the ought and of the might although distinguishable in the planes of ideas, are ultimately mixed up. The idea underlying our main working hypothesis as to the imposition of economic sanctions which as their own name suggest have an extensive economic aspect, particularly when they are adopted by the United States, is that an apparent violation of international law actually shows the relative verification of its provisions and that law and politics are mixed up and inevitably intertwined. In that sense and contrary to what may be extensively suggested, public international law is complied with even if the imposition of economic sanctions as they are imposed today may suggest otherwise. Este artículo presenta como hipótesis central de trabajo que en el actuar de los Estados-Nación y en el contexto preciso de la imposición de sanciones económicas unilaterales o multilaterales a la luz de los instrumentos internacionales vigentes, particularmente el International Bill of Rights, cuyos objetivos centrales son cambiar la conducta de un Estado o un gobierno y castigar una conducta estimada como reprochable de ese Estado o ese gobierno, el derecho internacional es eficaz y efectivo relativamente y los mundos del ought (deber-Derecho) y del might (poder-Política), aunque distinguibles y diferenciables en el plano teórico, terminan confundiéndose en el plano práctico o de la praxis. La principal idea subyacente de nuestra hipótesis de trabajo radica en que una aparente inobservancia del derecho internacional público en materia de imposición de sanciones, sobre todo unilaterales, en particular por parte de los Estados Unidos de América, y que tienen una connotación sobre todo económica, significaría una realización relativa del mismo, y que los fenómenos de deber y poder, y correspondientemente de derecho y política, terminan confundiéndose, no pudiéndose por tanto hablar de una inefectividad o ineficacia absolutas de las normas de derecho internacional público. La aproximación metodológica al estado de la cuestión del presente trabajo es hermenéutica, y se examinan por tanto no solo los textos relevantes, sino también la conducta de los Estados, tanto aquellos que imponen las sanciones económicas (sender States) como aquellos contra los cuales se imponen (target States). 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