The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods

In the late 1980s, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner proposed a supplementary but controversial theory about how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Specifically, the authors coined the concept of the “penalty default rule”. This is a default rule that penalizes the silence of the contracting parties b...

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Autor Principal: Monroy C., Daniel A.
Formato: Online
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Departamento de Derecho Civil 2016
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/4552
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institution Universidad Externado de Colombia
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language Español (Spanish)
format Online
author Monroy C., Daniel A.
spellingShingle Monroy C., Daniel A.
The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
author_facet Monroy C., Daniel A.
author_sort Monroy C., Daniel A.
title The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
title_short The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
title_full The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
title_fullStr The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
title_full_unstemmed The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods
title_sort penalty default rule in colombian contract law: the case of the contract of carriage of goods
description In the late 1980s, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner proposed a supplementary but controversial theory about how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Specifically, the authors coined the concept of the “penalty default rule”. This is a default rule that penalizes the silence of the contracting parties by filling a gap with a term that the majority of parties wouldn’t have wanted. Based on this theoretical background, the aim of this paper is to show that indeed, there are penalty defaults rules in Colombian contract law. To this end, the paper (I) proposes a methodology to identify hypothetical factual situations in which penalti defaults should be established; subsequently, (II) this methodology is tested in light of the central example of “penalty default rules” described by Ayres and Gertner; finally, (III) the methodology is once again tested, but using an example of Colombian contract law.
publisher Departamento de Derecho Civil
publishDate 2016
url https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/4552
_version_ 1667459981597736960
spelling ojs-article-45522020-05-16T02:11:05Z The Penalty Default Rule in Colombian Contract Law: The Case of the Contract of Carriage of Goods Reglas supletivas “sancionatorias” en el derecho de contratos colombiano: el caso del contrato de transporte Monroy C., Daniel A. Law and Economics contract law default rules Law Making. Derecho de contratos Análisis Económico del Derecho de Contratos reglas supletivas In the late 1980s, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner proposed a supplementary but controversial theory about how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Specifically, the authors coined the concept of the “penalty default rule”. This is a default rule that penalizes the silence of the contracting parties by filling a gap with a term that the majority of parties wouldn’t have wanted. Based on this theoretical background, the aim of this paper is to show that indeed, there are penalty defaults rules in Colombian contract law. To this end, the paper (I) proposes a methodology to identify hypothetical factual situations in which penalti defaults should be established; subsequently, (II) this methodology is tested in light of the central example of “penalty default rules” described by Ayres and Gertner; finally, (III) the methodology is once again tested, but using an example of Colombian contract law. A finales de la década de 1980, Ayres y Gertner propusieron una controversial teoría sobre cómo integrar el contenido de lagunas en contratos incompletos, acuñando la noción de “penalty default rule” (regla supletiva sancionatoria) para referirse a aquella regla que “sanciona” el silencio de las partes integrando al contrato una regla supletiva que “no” coincide con lo que la mayoría de las partes hubiesen querido. Bajo esta premisa, el artículo pretende demostrar que dichas reglas supletivas sancionatorias existen en el derecho de contratos colombiano. Así, (I) propone una metodología para identificar situaciones contractuales hipotéticas donde conviene establecer reglas supletivas sancionatorias; (II) somete a prueba la metodología a la luz del principal caso de estudio descrito por Ayres y Gertner, y (III) replica la metodología con un caso propio del derecho de contratos colombiano. Departamento de Derecho Civil 2016-06-15 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/html https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/4552 10.18601/01234366.n30.08 Revista de Derecho Privado; Núm. 30 (2016): Enero-Junio; 221-254 Revista de Derecho Privado; No 30 (2016): January-June; 221-254 2346-2442 0123-4366 spa /*ref*/Anderson, R., “Incidental and Consequential Damages”, Journal of Law and Commerce, v. 7, n.º 2, 1987, 327-468. /*ref*/Aron, M., “The Principle of Hadley v. 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score 11,392241