La economía de la banca central

Desde 1989, veinticinco países de diferentes partes del mundo han fortalecido sustancialmente la autonomía legal de sus bancos centrales'. Esta tendencia es particularmente sorprendente, si se tiene en cuenta que durante los últimos cuarenta años, los cambios observados en la legislación de su...

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Autor Principal: Cukierman, Alex
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Banco de la República 1996
Acceso en línea:https://publicaciones.banrepcultural.org/index.php/banrep/article/view/12057
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recordtype ojs
institution Publicaciones Banco de la República
collection OJS
language Español (Spanish)
format Artículo (Article)
author Cukierman, Alex
spellingShingle Cukierman, Alex
La economía de la banca central
author_facet Cukierman, Alex
author_sort Cukierman, Alex
title La economía de la banca central
title_short La economía de la banca central
title_full La economía de la banca central
title_fullStr La economía de la banca central
title_full_unstemmed La economía de la banca central
title_sort la economía de la banca central
description Desde 1989, veinticinco países de diferentes partes del mundo han fortalecido sustancialmente la autonomía legal de sus bancos centrales'. Esta tendencia es particularmente sorprendente, si se tiene en cuenta que durante los últimos cuarenta años, los cambios observados en la legislación de su banca central eran relativamente escasos.Esta ponencia pretende mostrar un amplio análisis del reciente desarrollo en este campo de rápido crecimiento. Su objetivo es tratar los problemas más relevantes de la banca central en lo que concierne a las economías desarrolladas y en vías de desarrollo. Aunque la ponencia hace una revisión tanto de los resultados formales como informales, está escrita en forma tal que sea comprensible por una amplia audiencia.
publisher Banco de la República
publishDate 1996
url https://publicaciones.banrepcultural.org/index.php/banrep/article/view/12057
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spelling ojs-article-120572019-01-09T14:21:58Z La economía de la banca central Cukierman, Alex Bancos centrales Autonomía Inflación Precios Tasa de cambio Política monetaria Crecimiento económico Metas nominales Supervisión financiera Economías socialistas E58 - Bancos centrales y sus políticas Desde 1989, veinticinco países de diferentes partes del mundo han fortalecido sustancialmente la autonomía legal de sus bancos centrales'. Esta tendencia es particularmente sorprendente, si se tiene en cuenta que durante los últimos cuarenta años, los cambios observados en la legislación de su banca central eran relativamente escasos.Esta ponencia pretende mostrar un amplio análisis del reciente desarrollo en este campo de rápido crecimiento. Su objetivo es tratar los problemas más relevantes de la banca central en lo que concierne a las economías desarrolladas y en vías de desarrollo. 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