A note on risk-sharing mechanisms for the colombian health insurance system

We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Riascos Villegas, Álvaro José, Camelo Gómez, Sergio Armando
Formato: Desconocido (Unknown)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8718
Descripción
Sumario:We evaluate, in terms of efficiency and selection incentives, four different ex post risk sharing mecha-nisms. Outlier risk sharing (ORS), proportional risk sharing (PRS), risk sharing for high costs (RSHC)and risk sharing for high risks. Our results suggest that the best mechanism in terms of their impliedefficiency selection trade off are, risk sharing for high costs and risk sharing for high risks. In general,outlier risk sharing has a poor performance. Our results are robust with respect to different scenariosfor ex ante risk adjustment or incentives for efficiency and selection based on expected or realized costs.We believe that the most realistic scenario analysed is one in which insurance companies use expectedreimbursements and costs as their best source of information (signal) to decide on efficiency and selectiontrade-offs. In this case, we found that risk sharing of high risks dominates all other mechanisms.