Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that wher...
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
2018
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ir-1992-83102020-09-16T20:21:25Z Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences Provisión privada de bienes públicos : neutralidad y preferencias dependientes de la riqueza Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés Income distribution Neutrality theorem Private provision Public goods Bienes públicos Distribución del ingreso D31 Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision. Varios han estudiado los límites del teorema de neutralidad bajo el mecanismo de provisión privada de bienes públicos. Siguiendo esta línea de investigación, este artículo estudia un nuevo caso en el cual dicho teorema falla. En particular, se considera un caso en el cual las preferencias individuales por los bienes son afectadas por el nivel de riqueza de los individuos. Bajo estas circunstancias, prueba que la neutralidad no necesariamente cumple. También se estudian las circunstancias bajo las cuales una redistribución de la riqueza puede mejorar la eficiencia en la provisión final de bienes Interesante, se encuentra que una redistribución de la riqueza de individuos con una baja valoración por el bien público a individuos con una alta valoración por el bien público no necesariamente incrementa la provisión agregada de dicho bien. 2018-09-27T16:52:03Z 2018-09-27T16:52:03Z 2012 document publishedVersion 1657-5334 http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8310 1657-7191 eng Documentos CEDE No. 15 Julio de 2012 Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores. openAccess Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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language |
Inglés (English) |
topic |
Income distribution Neutrality theorem Private provision Public goods Bienes públicos Distribución del ingreso D31 |
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Income distribution Neutrality theorem Private provision Public goods Bienes públicos Distribución del ingreso D31 Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
description |
Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision. |
format |
Desconocido (Unknown) |
author |
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés |
author_facet |
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés |
author_sort |
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés |
title |
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
title_short |
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
title_full |
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
title_fullStr |
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
title_full_unstemmed |
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
title_sort |
private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences |
publisher |
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8310 |
_version_ |
1705932382852349952 |
score |
12,131701 |