Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences

Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that wher...

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Autor Principal: Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
Formato: Desconocido (Unknown)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE 2018
Materias:
D31
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8310
id ir-1992-8310
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-1992-83102020-09-16T20:21:25Z Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences Provisión privada de bienes públicos : neutralidad y preferencias dependientes de la riqueza Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés Income distribution Neutrality theorem Private provision Public goods Bienes públicos Distribución del ingreso D31 Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision. Varios han estudiado los límites del teorema de neutralidad bajo el mecanismo de provisión privada de bienes públicos. Siguiendo esta línea de investigación, este artículo estudia un nuevo caso en el cual dicho teorema falla. En particular, se considera un caso en el cual las preferencias individuales por los bienes son afectadas por el nivel de riqueza de los individuos. Bajo estas circunstancias, prueba que la neutralidad no necesariamente cumple. También se estudian las circunstancias bajo las cuales una redistribución de la riqueza puede mejorar la eficiencia en la provisión final de bienes Interesante, se encuentra que una redistribución de la riqueza de individuos con una baja valoración por el bien público a individuos con una alta valoración por el bien público no necesariamente incrementa la provisión agregada de dicho bien. 2018-09-27T16:52:03Z 2018-09-27T16:52:03Z 2012 document publishedVersion 1657-5334 http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8310 1657-7191 eng Documentos CEDE No. 15 Julio de 2012 Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores. openAccess Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
institution Universidad de los Andes
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Income distribution
Neutrality theorem
Private provision
Public goods
Bienes públicos
Distribución del ingreso
D31
spellingShingle Income distribution
Neutrality theorem
Private provision
Public goods
Bienes públicos
Distribución del ingreso
D31
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
description Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision.
format Desconocido (Unknown)
author Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
author_facet Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
author_sort Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
title Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
title_short Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
title_full Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
title_fullStr Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
title_full_unstemmed Private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
title_sort private provision of public goods : neutrality and wealth-dependent preferences
publisher Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publishDate 2018
url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8310
_version_ 1705932382852349952
score 12,131701