%0 Desconocido (Unknown) %A Tovar Mora, Jorge Andrés %I Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE %D 2018 %G Inglés (English) %T Risk, concentration and market power in the banking industry : evidence from the Colombian System (1997-2006) %U http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8181 %X This paper examines the relationship between risk, concentration and the exercise of market power by banking institutions. We use monthly balance-sheet and interest rate data for the Colombian banking system from 1997 to 2006. The evidence shows that, in the face of high risk, banks transfer a larger share of risk to customers through higher intermediation margins. The result suggests that systemic risk acts as a "collusion" device for banks: while high concentration is not enough to have collusion, the true effects of high market concentration on interest rates' mark-ups emerge when the system is under stress.