Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets

By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colo...

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Autores Principales: Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés, Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
Formato: Desconocido (Unknown)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
id ir-1992-8155
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-1992-81552020-09-16T20:19:55Z Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets Comportamiento estratégico, valoración de recursos y competencia en sectores eléctricos Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José Multi-unit auctions Oligopoly Electricity markets Subastas Oligopolios Producción de energía eléctrica D44, D43, L94 By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction.  Por medio de un juego Bayesiano estudiamos sectores eléctricos spot desde un punto de vista estructural. Nos concentramos en el problema de eficiencia individual y agregada, y mostramos como encontrar valoraciones de recursos cómo el agua a partir de variables observables en el mercado. Comparamos estos resultados con los resultantes por métodos de ingeniería y aplicamos nuestra metodología al mercado spot del sector eléctrico colombiano. Nuestros resultados muestran que plantas de gas grandes e hidroeléctricas pequeñas sobre-reportan; recursos cómo el agua son subestimados por métodos de ingeniería y los costos agregados de producción energética hubiesen sido considerablemente menores si los agentes del sector se hubiesen comportado óptimamente. Costos revelados muestran una ganancia sustancial en eficiencia en la subasta Vickrey comparada con la subasta uniforme que actualmente utiliza el sector. 2018-09-27T16:50:54Z 2018-09-27T16:50:54Z 2010 document publishedVersion 1657-5334 http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155 1657-7191 eng Documentos CEDE No. 10 Marzo de 2010 Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores. openAccess Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
institution Universidad de los Andes
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
spellingShingle Multi-unit auctions
Oligopoly
Electricity markets
Subastas
Oligopolios
Producción de energía eléctrica
D44, D43, L94
Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
description By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction. 
format Desconocido (Unknown)
author Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
author_facet Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
author_sort Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés
title Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_short Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_full Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_fullStr Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_full_unstemmed Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
title_sort strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets
publisher Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publishDate 2018
url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
_version_ 1705932396987154432
score 11,828437