Strategic behaviour, resource valuation and competition in electricity markets

By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Espinosa Farfán, Miguel Andrés, Riascos Villegas, Alvaro José
Formato: Desconocido (Unknown)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8155
Descripción
Sumario:By means of a suitable Bayesian game we study spot electricity markets from a structural point of view. We address the problem of individual and aggregate eficciency and we show how to value water from market observables. We compare the former to engineering methods and apply our methodology to Colombian spot electricity market. Our results show that big gas and small hydro plants overbid, resources are undervalued by engineering costs and aggregate costs would have been considerably smaller if agents had played optimally. Revealed costs show a substantial gain in eficciency in the Vickrey auction compared to the actual uniform auction.