Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms

This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority¿minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Co...

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Autores Principales: González, M., Guzmán, A., Pombo, C., Trujillo, M.A.
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46901
id ir-1992-46901
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-1992-469012020-11-04T20:20:40Z Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms González, M. Guzmán, A. Pombo, C. Trujillo, M.A. Family firms Dividend policy Agency problems, Closely held firms Colombia This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority¿minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement. 2020-10-01T16:46:34Z 2020-10-01T16:46:34Z 2014 article publishedVersion http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46901 10.1177/0894486514538448 https://doi.org/10.1177/0894486514538448 eng openAccess application/pdf instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca
institution Universidad de los Andes
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Family firms
Dividend policy
Agency problems, Closely held firms
Colombia
spellingShingle Family firms
Dividend policy
Agency problems, Closely held firms
Colombia
González, M.
Guzmán, A.
Pombo, C.
Trujillo, M.A.
Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
description This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority¿minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not affect dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids affects dividend policy negatively; and family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement.
format Artículo (Article)
author González, M.
Guzmán, A.
Pombo, C.
Trujillo, M.A.
author_facet González, M.
Guzmán, A.
Pombo, C.
Trujillo, M.A.
author_sort González, M.
title Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
title_short Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
title_full Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
title_fullStr Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
title_full_unstemmed Family Involvement and Dividend Policy in Closely Held Firms
title_sort family involvement and dividend policy in closely held firms
publishDate 2020
url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46901
_version_ 1705934555110703104
score 11,828437