What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and other motivations such as altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and conformism. We test whether an econometric...
Autores Principales: | Vélez, M.A., Stranlund, J. K., Murphy, J.J. |
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Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
2020
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/1992/46810 |
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