Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics

Spinoza presents in his Ethics an ontology by virtue of which man is nothing more than a mode determined by others. Therefore, we find ourselves with a conception of man’s nature that has traditionally been considered deterministic. As some authors have denounced, such as Jacobi or Tschirnhaus, this...

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Autor Principal: Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11634/35705
id ir-11634-35705
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-11634-357052021-09-24T11:23:31Z Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics La conciliación entre libertad y necesidad en la Ética de Spinoza A conciliação entre liberdade e necessidade na Ética de Spinoza Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro Ethics freedom necessary freedom necessity Spinoza Ética libertad libertad necesaria necesidad Spinoza Ética liberdade liberdade necessária necessidade Spinoza Spinoza presents in his Ethics an ontology by virtue of which man is nothing more than a mode determined by others. Therefore, we find ourselves with a conception of man’s nature that has traditionally been considered deterministic. As some authors have denounced, such as Jacobi or Tschirnhaus, this conception, according to which all human action is necessary and is determined in advance, the absence of moral responsibility would follow. However, far from abandoning us to an amoral world, in Spinoza’s proposal there is present not only a certain conception of freedom, but also a normative conception of ethics. Consequently, this paper will show the path followed by the author of the Ethics to reach the conclusion that freedom and necessity are compatible concepts. This will be possible after addressing consecutively the anthropology, ontology and ethics conception of Spinoza. Spinoza presenta en su Ética una ontología en virtud de la cual el hombre no es más que un modo determinado por otros modos. Nos encontramos, así pues, con una concepción de la naturaleza del hombre que ha sido considerada tradicionalmente como determinista. Tal y como denunciaron algunos autores como Jacobi o Tschirnhaus, de esta concepción según la cual toda acción humana es necesaria y está determinada de antemano, se seguiría la ausencia de la responsabilidad moral. Ahora bien, lejos de abandonarnos en un mundo amoral, en la propuesta de Spinoza no sólo está presente una determinada concepción de la libertad, sino también una concepción normativa de la ética. En consecuencia, en el presente trabajo se mostrará la senda seguida por el autor de la Ética para llegar a la conclusión de que libertad y necesidad son conceptos compatibles. Esto será posible tras abordar consecutivamente la concepción antropológica, ontológica y ética spinoziana. Spinoza apresenta em sua Ética uma ontologia em virtude da qual o homem é apenas um modo determinado por outros modos. Por isso, nós nos deparamos com uma concepção da natureza do homem que tem sido tradicionalmente considerada determinista. Conforme denunciado por alguns autores como Jacobi ou Tschirnhaus, dessa concepção segundo a qual toda ação humana é necessária e determinada de antemão, seguiria a ausência de responsabilidade moral. Agora, longe de nos abandonar num mundo amoral, a proposta de Spinoza não só apresenta uma certa concepção de liberdade, mas também uma concepção normativa de ética. Consequentemente, este artigo mostrará o caminho seguido pelo autor da Ética para chegar à conclusão de que liberdade e necessidade são conceitos compatíveis. Isso será possível depois de abordar consecutivamente a concepção antropológica, ontológica e ética de Spinoziana. 2021-03-17 2021-09-24T11:23:31Z 2021-09-24T11:23:31Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://revistas.usantotomas.edu.co/index.php/analisis/article/view/6236 10.15332/21459169.6236 http://hdl.handle.net/11634/35705 spa https://revistas.usantotomas.edu.co/index.php/analisis/article/view/6236/6132 application/pdf Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia Analisis; Vol. 53 No. 98 (2021): La comunicación y su relación con las metamorfosis sociales Análisis; Vol. 53 Núm. 98 (2021): La comunicación y su relación con las metamorfosis sociales 2145-9169 0120-8454
institution Universidad Santo Tomas
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Ethics
freedom
necessary freedom
necessity
Spinoza
Ética
libertad
libertad necesaria
necesidad
Spinoza
Ética
liberdade
liberdade necessária
necessidade
Spinoza
spellingShingle Ethics
freedom
necessary freedom
necessity
Spinoza
Ética
libertad
libertad necesaria
necesidad
Spinoza
Ética
liberdade
liberdade necessária
necessidade
Spinoza
Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
description Spinoza presents in his Ethics an ontology by virtue of which man is nothing more than a mode determined by others. Therefore, we find ourselves with a conception of man’s nature that has traditionally been considered deterministic. As some authors have denounced, such as Jacobi or Tschirnhaus, this conception, according to which all human action is necessary and is determined in advance, the absence of moral responsibility would follow. However, far from abandoning us to an amoral world, in Spinoza’s proposal there is present not only a certain conception of freedom, but also a normative conception of ethics. Consequently, this paper will show the path followed by the author of the Ethics to reach the conclusion that freedom and necessity are compatible concepts. This will be possible after addressing consecutively the anthropology, ontology and ethics conception of Spinoza.
format Artículo (Article)
author Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
author_facet Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
author_sort Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
title Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
title_short Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
title_full Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
title_fullStr Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
title_full_unstemmed Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics
title_sort reconciling freedom and necessity in spinoza’s ethics
publisher Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia
publishDate 2021
url http://hdl.handle.net/11634/35705
_version_ 1712106589129801728
score 12,131701