Reconciling freedom and necessity in Spinoza’s Ethics

Spinoza presents in his Ethics an ontology by virtue of which man is nothing more than a mode determined by others. Therefore, we find ourselves with a conception of man’s nature that has traditionally been considered deterministic. As some authors have denounced, such as Jacobi or Tschirnhaus, this...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Villamor Iglesias, Alejandro
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad Santo Tomás, Bogotá, Colombia 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11634/35705
Descripción
Sumario:Spinoza presents in his Ethics an ontology by virtue of which man is nothing more than a mode determined by others. Therefore, we find ourselves with a conception of man’s nature that has traditionally been considered deterministic. As some authors have denounced, such as Jacobi or Tschirnhaus, this conception, according to which all human action is necessary and is determined in advance, the absence of moral responsibility would follow. However, far from abandoning us to an amoral world, in Spinoza’s proposal there is present not only a certain conception of freedom, but also a normative conception of ethics. Consequently, this paper will show the path followed by the author of the Ethics to reach the conclusion that freedom and necessity are compatible concepts. This will be possible after addressing consecutively the anthropology, ontology and ethics conception of Spinoza.