A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil

Bioethics emphasizes the primary importance of non-maleficence, be it as a principle or as the essential background of common morality. And yet, bioethics has not developed a deeper understanding about evil. The present text inquires perhaps radical evil – that order the human superfluity practiced,...

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Autor Principal: Kottow, Miguel
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad Militar Nueva Granada 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10654/34047
id ir-10654-34047
recordtype dspace
institution Universidad Militar Nueva Granada
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Bioethics
banality of evil
non maleficence
radical evil
bioética
banalidad del mal
mal radical
no maleficencia
Bioética
banalidade do mal
mal radical
não maleficência
spellingShingle Bioethics
banality of evil
non maleficence
radical evil
bioética
banalidad del mal
mal radical
no maleficencia
Bioética
banalidade do mal
mal radical
não maleficência
Kottow, Miguel
A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
description Bioethics emphasizes the primary importance of non-maleficence, be it as a principle or as the essential background of common morality. And yet, bioethics has not developed a deeper understanding about evil. The present text inquires perhaps radical evil – that order the human superfluity practiced, appealing to than atological biopolitics (“To make live and to let die” according to Focault) and the banality of evil understood as inexplicable maleficence perpetuated by thoughtlessness leading to moral turpitude. Both can coexist by bioethics that rejects the evil and requires responsibility from evildoers. The conclusion reached in this essay is that bioethical deliberations must defy biopolitics, and reject thoughtlessness that dismisses the assumption and adscription of responsibility. H. Arendt’s thoughts on evil are incompatible with the essential premise of [bio] ethics based on evaluating acts performed in liberty and responsibility.
format Artículo (Article)
author Kottow, Miguel
author_facet Kottow, Miguel
author_sort Kottow, Miguel
title A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
title_short A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
title_full A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
title_fullStr A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
title_full_unstemmed A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
title_sort bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil
publisher Universidad Militar Nueva Granada
publishDate 2014
url http://hdl.handle.net/10654/34047
_version_ 1712101803220271104
spelling ir-10654-340472020-01-08T19:31:23Z A bioethical reflection on maleficence and the banality of evil Maleficencia y la banalidad del mal: una reflexión bioética Maleficência e a banalidade do mal: uma reflexão bioética Kottow, Miguel Bioethics banality of evil non maleficence radical evil bioética banalidad del mal mal radical no maleficencia Bioética banalidade do mal mal radical não maleficência Bioethics emphasizes the primary importance of non-maleficence, be it as a principle or as the essential background of common morality. And yet, bioethics has not developed a deeper understanding about evil. The present text inquires perhaps radical evil – that order the human superfluity practiced, appealing to than atological biopolitics (“To make live and to let die” according to Focault) and the banality of evil understood as inexplicable maleficence perpetuated by thoughtlessness leading to moral turpitude. Both can coexist by bioethics that rejects the evil and requires responsibility from evildoers. The conclusion reached in this essay is that bioethical deliberations must defy biopolitics, and reject thoughtlessness that dismisses the assumption and adscription of responsibility. H. Arendt’s thoughts on evil are incompatible with the essential premise of [bio] ethics based on evaluating acts performed in liberty and responsibility. La bioética resalta la prominencia de la no maleficencia, sea como principio o como fundamentos de la moral común, pero no ha desarrollado una reflexión más profunda sobre el mal. El presente trabajo indaga acaso el mal radical —que decreta la superfluidad de lo humano ejercida, recurriendo a biopolíticas anatológicas (“hacer vivir y dejar morir” según la fórmula original de Foucault)— y la banalidad del mal entendida como maleficencia inexplicable basada en ceguera moral de los perpetradores; ambos pueden coexistir con una bioética que rechaza el mal y requiere la responsabilidad de quienes lo cometen. La conclusión es reconocer que la bioética se opone a toda biopolítica tanatológica y se niega a conceder que la ceguera moral sea excusa para no asumir la responsabilidad de actos maleficentes. La teoría sobre el mal de Arendt es incompatible con la reflexión fundamentada en evaluar actos emprendidos en libertas y responsabilidad. A bioética destaca a proeminência da não maleficência, seja como um princípio ou como fundamentações da moral do comum, mas não tem desenvolvido uma reflexão mais profunda sobre o mal. Este trabalho pesquisa o mal radical que decreta a superfluidade do humano exercida, usando as biopolíticas tanatológicas (“deixar viver, e fazer para morrer”, de acordo com a fórmula original de Foucault) – e a banalidade do mal entendida como maleficência inexplicável baseada na cegueira moral dos perpetradores, ambos podem coexistir com uma bioética que rejeita o mal e envolve a responsabilidade daqueles que o cometem. A conclusão é de reconhecer que a bioética opõe-se a qualquer biopolítica tanatologica e se recusa a admitir que a cegueira moral não seja desculpa para assumir a responsabilidade pelos atos maleficentes. A teoria sobre o mal de Arendt é incompatível com a reflexão fundamentada em avaliar atos praticados em libertar e a responsabilidade. 2014-02-17 2020-01-08T19:31:23Z 2020-01-08T19:31:23Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/495 10.18359/rlbi.495 http://hdl.handle.net/10654/34047 spa http://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/495/266 /*ref*/• Agamben, G. (2003). Homo sacer. Valencia: Pre-textos /*ref*/• Agamben, G. (2004). Estado de excepción. Buenos Aires: Adriana Hidalgo Editora, S.A. /*ref*/• Arendt, H. (1968). The Origin of Totalitarianism. Orlando: Harvest Book. /*ref*/• Arendt, H. (1965). Eichmann in Jerusalem:A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press. /*ref*/• Arendt, H. (2006). Über das Böse. Münche: Piper Verlag. /*ref*/• Augstein, F. (2006). Taten und Täter. En H. Arendt (Ed.), Über das Böse (pp. 177-195). München: Piper Verlag. /*ref*/• Bernstein, R.J. (1996). Hanna Arendt and the Jewish Question. Cambridge: Polity Press. /*ref*/• Calder, T. (2013). The Concept of Evil. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Recuperado de https://Leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/ /*ref*/• Casado, M. (2000). Hacia una concepción flexible de la bioética. En M. Casado (Comp.), Estudios de bioética y derecho (pp. 21-34).Valencia: Tirado Lo Blanch. /*ref*/• Kottow, M. (2011). Bioética y la Nueva Salud Pública. Nuevos Folios de Bioética, 4(5). /*ref*/• Gross, M.L. (2006). Bioethics and armed conflict. Cambridge/London: The MIT Press. /*ref*/• Passerin d’Entreves, M. (2013). Hannah Arendt. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Recuperado de https://Leibniz.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/arendt/.b /*ref*/• Rancière, J. (2004). Who is the subject of the rights of man? The South Atlantic Quarterly, 103(2/3), 297-310. Derechos de autor 2016 Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 application/pdf Universidad Militar Nueva Granada Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética; Vol. 14 Núm. 26-1 (2014): Bioética: conocimiento, ciencia y pertinencia social.; 38-47 2462-859X 1657-4702
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