Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes
This paper is a first attempt to model the effects of reference pricing on the innovation effort of pharmaceutical firms. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. The games includes research stages where the innov...
| Autores Principales: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| Lenguaje: | Español (Spanish) |
| Publicado: |
Universidad del Rosario
2005
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/3887 |
| id |
ir-10336-3887 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
dspace |
| spelling |
ir-10336-38872019-09-19T12:37:01Z Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes Bommier, A. Jullien, B. Bardey, David Publicaciones universitarias::Bogotá (Colombia) Publicaciones académicas::Bogotá (Colombia) Educación superior Medicamentos::Investigaciones Innovation Mee-too Reference pricing Pharmaceutical laboratories This paper is a first attempt to model the effects of reference pricing on the innovation effort of pharmaceutical firms. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. The games includes research stages where the innovation efforts by the firms are determined and introductory stages where a price for a new medicament is fixed. We model the negotiation between the drug owner and the regulator to fix the price, first without legal constraint, second under the regime of reference pricing in therapeutic classes. We then solve the innovation game where the firms anticipate the results of the negotiation round on prices. We thus consider the effect of the therapeutic class regulation on both prices and the innovation pace. The final stage consists in calibrating the model with a small data on anti-statine in France and simulates the effect of the change in regulatory regime. This paper is a first attempt to model the effects of reference pricing on the innovation effort of pharmaceutical firms. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. The games includes research stages where the innovation efforts by the firms are determined and introductory stages where a price for a new medicament is fixed. We model the negotiation between the drug owner and the regulator to fix the price, first without legal constraint, second under the regime of reference pricing in therapeutic classes. We then solve the innovation game where the firms anticipate the results of the negotiation round on prices. We thus consider the effect of the therapeutic class regulation on both prices and the innovation pace. The final stage consists in calibrating the model with a small data on anti-statine in France and simulates the effect of the change in regulatory regime. 2005-11 2012-09-24T15:37:42Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/3887 spa http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Universidad del Rosario. Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
Español (Spanish) |
| topic |
Publicaciones universitarias::Bogotá (Colombia) Publicaciones académicas::Bogotá (Colombia) Educación superior Medicamentos::Investigaciones Innovation Mee-too Reference pricing Pharmaceutical laboratories |
| spellingShingle |
Publicaciones universitarias::Bogotá (Colombia) Publicaciones académicas::Bogotá (Colombia) Educación superior Medicamentos::Investigaciones Innovation Mee-too Reference pricing Pharmaceutical laboratories Bommier, A. Jullien, B. Bardey, David Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| description |
This paper is a first attempt to model the effects of reference pricing on the innovation effort of pharmaceutical firms. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and
a regulatory entity. The games includes research stages where the innovation
efforts by the firms are determined and introductory stages where a price for a new medicament is fixed. We model the negotiation between the drug owner and the regulator to fix the price, first without legal constraint, second under the regime of reference pricing in therapeutic classes. We then solve the innovation game where the firms anticipate the results of the negotiation round on prices. We thus consider the effect of the therapeutic class regulation on both prices and the innovation pace. The final stage consists in calibrating the model with a small data on anti-statine in France and simulates the effect of the change in regulatory regime. |
| format |
Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| author |
Bommier, A. Jullien, B. Bardey, David |
| author_facet |
Bommier, A. Jullien, B. Bardey, David |
| author_sort |
Bommier, A. |
| title |
Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| title_short |
Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| title_full |
Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| title_fullStr |
Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| title_sort |
pharmaceutical innovation, reference pricing and therapeutic classes |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2005 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/3887 |
| _version_ |
1645142151321878528 |
| score |
12,131701 |