It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement
This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility. . . ) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the mor...
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| Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
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Society for Judgment and Decision Making
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27911 |
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ir-10336-279112021-01-21T08:17:05Z It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement No es correcto, pero está permitido: efectos de redacción en el juicio moral Barbosa, Sergio Jimmenez Leal, William Moral judgment Wording effects Social conventions Law This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility. . . ) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny. 2017 2020-08-19T14:44:35Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion EISSN: 1930-2975 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27911 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Society for Judgment and Decision Making Judgment and Decision Making |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
Inglés (English) |
| topic |
Moral judgment Wording effects Social conventions Law |
| spellingShingle |
Moral judgment Wording effects Social conventions Law Barbosa, Sergio Jimmenez Leal, William It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| description |
This study aims to provide evidence about two widely held assumptions in the experimental study of moral judgment. First, that different terms used to ask for moral judgment (e.g., blame, wrongness, permissibility. . . ) can be treated as synonyms and hence used interchangeably. Second, that the moral and legal status of the judged action are independent of one another and thus moral judgment have no influence of legal or other conventional considerations. Previous research shows mixed results on these claims. We recruited 660 participants who provided moral judgment to three identical sacrificial dilemmas using seven different terms. We experimentally manipulated the explicit legal status of the judged action. Results suggest that terms that highlight the utilitarian nature of the judged action cause harsher moral judgments as a mechanism of reputation preservation. Also, the manipulation of the legal status of the judged action holds for all considered terms but is larger for impermissibility judgments. Taken as a whole, our results imply that, although subtle, different terms used to ask for moral judgment have theoretically and methodologically relevant differences which calls for further scrutiny. |
| format |
Artículo (Article) |
| author |
Barbosa, Sergio Jimmenez Leal, William |
| author_facet |
Barbosa, Sergio Jimmenez Leal, William |
| author_sort |
Barbosa, Sergio |
| title |
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_short |
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_full |
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_fullStr |
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_full_unstemmed |
It’s not right but it’s permitted: Wording effects in moral judgement |
| title_sort |
it’s not right but it’s permitted: wording effects in moral judgement |
| publisher |
Society for Judgment and Decision Making |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27911 |
| _version_ |
1690577323273748480 |
| score |
12,131701 |