Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a...
Autores Principales: | , |
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Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2010
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27356 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.003 |