Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Fairness requires to treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Kayi, Cagatay, Ramaekers, Eve
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Elsevier 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27356
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.003