To suggest is to commit? a common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations
I report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives open...
Autor Principal: | Mantilla Ribero, Cesar Andres |
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Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27116 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.09.001 |
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