Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: An experimental investigation

In many auctions the valuation structure involves both private and common value elements. Existing experimental evidence (e.g. Goeree and Offerman in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(3):625–643, 2002) demonstrates that first-price auctions with this valuation structure tend to be inefficient, and inexperienced sub...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Aycinena, Diego, Baltaduonis,Rimvydas, Rentschler,Lucas
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Springer Nature 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26391
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9359-7