Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...
Autores Principales: | Jaramillo, Paula, Kayi, Cagatay, Klijn, Flip |
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Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2013
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 |
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