Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...

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Autores Principales: Jaramillo, Paula, Kayi, Cagatay::385471::600, Klijn, Flip
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Publicado: Elsevier 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
id ir-10336-24713
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-247132020-06-11T13:21:04Z Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare Jaramillo, Paula Kayi, Cagatay::385471::600 Klijn, Flip Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc. 2013 2020-06-11T13:21:04Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 0899-8256 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess application/pdf Elsevier instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
topic Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
spellingShingle Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
Jaramillo, Paula
Kayi, Cagatay::385471::600
Klijn, Flip
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
description We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
format Artículo (Article)
author Jaramillo, Paula
Kayi, Cagatay::385471::600
Klijn, Flip
author_facet Jaramillo, Paula
Kayi, Cagatay::385471::600
Klijn, Flip
author_sort Jaramillo, Paula
title Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_short Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_full Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_fullStr Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_full_unstemmed Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_sort equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2013
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
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score 11,388254