Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...
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ir-10336-247132021-09-07T05:04:39Z Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare Jaramillo, Paula Kayi, Cagatay Klijn, Flip Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc. 2013 2020-06-11T13:21:04Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 0899-8256 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess application/pdf Elsevier instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
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EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
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language |
Inglés (English) |
topic |
Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare |
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Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare Jaramillo, Paula Kayi, Cagatay Klijn, Flip Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
description |
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc. |
format |
Artículo (Article) |
author |
Jaramillo, Paula Kayi, Cagatay Klijn, Flip |
author_facet |
Jaramillo, Paula Kayi, Cagatay Klijn, Flip |
author_sort |
Jaramillo, Paula |
title |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_short |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_full |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_fullStr |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_full_unstemmed |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_sort |
equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
publisher |
Elsevier |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 |
_version_ |
1712098585788547072 |
score |
12,131701 |