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Informed entry in auctions

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Aycinena, Diego, Bejarano H., Rentschler L.
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Springer Verlag 2018
Materias:
Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
id ir-10336-24357
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-243572022-05-02T12:37:13Z Informed entry in auctions Aycinena, Diego Bejarano H. Rentschler L. Auctions Bidding Endogenous entry Experiments We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany. 2018 2020-05-26T00:12:05Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 14321270 00207276 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Springer Verlag instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
spellingShingle Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
Aycinena, Diego
Bejarano H.
Rentschler L.
Informed entry in auctions
description We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.
format Artículo (Article)
author Aycinena, Diego
Bejarano H.
Rentschler L.
author_facet Aycinena, Diego
Bejarano H.
Rentschler L.
author_sort Aycinena, Diego
title Informed entry in auctions
title_short Informed entry in auctions
title_full Informed entry in auctions
title_fullStr Informed entry in auctions
title_full_unstemmed Informed entry in auctions
title_sort informed entry in auctions
publisher Springer Verlag
publishDate 2018
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
_version_ 1740172219050360832
score 12,131701

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