Informed entry in auctions

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Aycinena, Diego, Bejarano H., Rentschler L.
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Springer Verlag 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9