Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis

"In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interacti...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Blanco, Mariana, Engelmann, Dirk, Koch, Alexander K., Normann, Hans-Theo
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005

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