Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis

"In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interacti...

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Autores Principales: Blanco, Mariana, Engelmann, Dirk, Koch, Alexander K., Normann, Hans-Theo
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005
id ir-10336-24119
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-241192021-01-21T08:32:55Z Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis Blanco, Mariana Engelmann, Dirk Koch, Alexander K. Normann, Hans-Theo Beliefs Consensus effect Experimental economics Social dilemma "In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves. © 2014 Elsevier Inc." 2014 2020-05-26T00:08:50Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 10902473 08998256 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Academic Press Inc. instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Beliefs
Consensus effect
Experimental economics
Social dilemma
spellingShingle Beliefs
Consensus effect
Experimental economics
Social dilemma
Blanco, Mariana
Engelmann, Dirk
Koch, Alexander K.
Normann, Hans-Theo
Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
description "In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves. © 2014 Elsevier Inc."
format Artículo (Article)
author Blanco, Mariana
Engelmann, Dirk
Koch, Alexander K.
Normann, Hans-Theo
author_facet Blanco, Mariana
Engelmann, Dirk
Koch, Alexander K.
Normann, Hans-Theo
author_sort Blanco, Mariana
title Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
title_short Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
title_full Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
title_fullStr Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
title_full_unstemmed Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
title_sort preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
publisher Academic Press Inc.
publishDate 2014
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005
_version_ 1690577425850695680
score 11,828437