The Need for Enemies

"We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Fergusson L., Robinson J.A., Torvik R., Vargas J.F.
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23884
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12174
id ir-10336-23884
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-238842021-01-21T08:31:25Z The Need for Enemies Fergusson L. Robinson J.A. Torvik R. Vargas J.F. Electoral system Political power Political relations Colombia "We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage. © 2014 Royal Economic Society" 2016 2020-05-26T00:06:23Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 14680297 00130133 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23884 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12174 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Blackwell Publishing Ltd instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Electoral system
Political power
Political relations
Colombia
spellingShingle Electoral system
Political power
Political relations
Colombia
Fergusson L.
Robinson J.A.
Torvik R.
Vargas J.F.
The Need for Enemies
description "We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage. © 2014 Royal Economic Society"
format Artículo (Article)
author Fergusson L.
Robinson J.A.
Torvik R.
Vargas J.F.
author_facet Fergusson L.
Robinson J.A.
Torvik R.
Vargas J.F.
author_sort Fergusson L.
title The Need for Enemies
title_short The Need for Enemies
title_full The Need for Enemies
title_fullStr The Need for Enemies
title_full_unstemmed The Need for Enemies
title_sort need for enemies
publisher Blackwell Publishing Ltd
publishDate 2016
url https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23884
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12174
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score 11,828437