"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina"
"Under what conditions can courts produce political and social change? My claim is that courts can be most consequential when they act in concert with other actors to create political spaces for ongoing discussion and engagement with regard to rights. In explaining judicial impact, I focus on t...
| Autor Principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
| Publicado: |
City University of New York
2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23754 |
| id |
ir-10336-23754 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
dspace |
| spelling |
ir-10336-237542021-08-18T11:13:58Z "Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" Botero, Sandra Judges litigants politics rights enforcement Argentina "Under what conditions can courts produce political and social change? My claim is that courts can be most consequential when they act in concert with other actors to create political spaces for ongoing discussion and engagement with regard to rights. In explaining judicial impact, I focus on the novel and understudied oversight mechanisms-like follow-up committees and public hearings-That some assertive high courts deploy to monitor adherence to some of their rulings. The analysis is based on comparative case studies of two landmark socioeconomic rights cases handed down by the Argentine Supreme Court. I show that the deployment of oversight mechanisms can create institutional spaces where the court, elected leaders, and private and civil society actors converge to generate change, resulting in greater impact. © 2018 City University of New York. All rights reserved." 2018 2020-05-26T00:05:06Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 104159 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23754 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf City University of New York instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
Inglés (English) |
| topic |
Judges litigants politics rights enforcement Argentina |
| spellingShingle |
Judges litigants politics rights enforcement Argentina Botero, Sandra "Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| description |
"Under what conditions can courts produce political and social change? My claim is that courts can be most consequential when they act in concert with other actors to create political spaces for ongoing discussion and engagement with regard to rights. In explaining judicial impact, I focus on the novel and understudied oversight mechanisms-like follow-up committees and public hearings-That some assertive high courts deploy to monitor adherence to some of their rulings. The analysis is based on comparative case studies of two landmark socioeconomic rights cases handed down by the Argentine Supreme Court. I show that the deployment of oversight mechanisms can create institutional spaces where the court, elected leaders, and private and civil society actors converge to generate change, resulting in greater impact. © 2018 City University of New York. All rights reserved." |
| format |
Artículo (Article) |
| author |
Botero, Sandra |
| author_facet |
Botero, Sandra |
| author_sort |
Botero, Sandra |
| title |
"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| title_short |
"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| title_full |
"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| title_fullStr |
"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| title_full_unstemmed |
"Judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in Argentina" |
| title_sort |
"judges, litigants, and the politics of rights enforcement in argentina" |
| publisher |
City University of New York |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23754 |
| _version_ |
1712098494555095040 |
| score |
11,887996 |