Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem
In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests ef...
| Autor Principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
| Publicado: |
De Gruyter
2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23456 https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0190 |