Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence
We experimentally examine perfectly discriminating contests under three valuation structures: pure common-value, pure private-value and a case with both private and common value components. In line with the results from the previous literature, we find that, regardless of valuation structure, contes...
Autores Principales: | Aycinena, Diego, Baltaduonis R., Rentschler L. |
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Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
Springer New York LLC
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22908 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0568-7 |
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