The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter
This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective...
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| Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
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2012
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| Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22362 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.04.002 |
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ir-10336-223622022-05-02T12:37:20Z The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter Bardey D. Canta C. Lozachmeur J.-M. Differentiation Health care Health services Regulatory framework Article Economic aspect Government regulation Health care cost Health care quality Health insurance Patient transport Prospective payment Reimbursement Remuneration Resource allocation Social welfare Europe Government regulation Health care costs Health personnel Humans Prospective payment system Quality of health care Reimbursement mechanisms Health care Horizontal and vertical differentiation Mixed payment schemes Regulation economic Models This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective payment, the optimal price involves a trade-off between the level of quality provision and the level of horizontal differentiation. If this pure prospective payment leads to underprovision of quality and overdifferentiation, a mixed reimbursement scheme allows the regulator to improve the allocation efficiency. This is true for a relatively low level of patients' transportation costs. We also show that if the regulator cannot commit to the level of the cost reimbursement rate, the resulting allocation can dominate the one with full commitment. This occurs when the transportation cost is low or high enough, and the full commitment solution either implies full or zero cost reimbursement. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. 2012 2020-05-25T23:56:13Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 1676296 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22362 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.04.002 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf instname:Universidad del Rosario |
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EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
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DSpace |
| language |
Inglés (English) |
| topic |
Differentiation Health care Health services Regulatory framework Article Economic aspect Government regulation Health care cost Health care quality Health insurance Patient transport Prospective payment Reimbursement Remuneration Resource allocation Social welfare Europe Government regulation Health care costs Health personnel Humans Prospective payment system Quality of health care Reimbursement mechanisms Health care Horizontal and vertical differentiation Mixed payment schemes Regulation economic Models |
| spellingShingle |
Differentiation Health care Health services Regulatory framework Article Economic aspect Government regulation Health care cost Health care quality Health insurance Patient transport Prospective payment Reimbursement Remuneration Resource allocation Social welfare Europe Government regulation Health care costs Health personnel Humans Prospective payment system Quality of health care Reimbursement mechanisms Health care Horizontal and vertical differentiation Mixed payment schemes Regulation economic Models Bardey D. Canta C. Lozachmeur J.-M. The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| description |
This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective payment, the optimal price involves a trade-off between the level of quality provision and the level of horizontal differentiation. If this pure prospective payment leads to underprovision of quality and overdifferentiation, a mixed reimbursement scheme allows the regulator to improve the allocation efficiency. This is true for a relatively low level of patients' transportation costs. We also show that if the regulator cannot commit to the level of the cost reimbursement rate, the resulting allocation can dominate the one with full commitment. This occurs when the transportation cost is low or high enough, and the full commitment solution either implies full or zero cost reimbursement. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. |
| format |
Artículo (Article) |
| author |
Bardey D. Canta C. Lozachmeur J.-M. |
| author_facet |
Bardey D. Canta C. Lozachmeur J.-M. |
| author_sort |
Bardey D. |
| title |
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| title_short |
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| title_full |
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| title_fullStr |
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| title_sort |
regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22362 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.04.002 |
| _version_ |
1740172520662761472 |
| score |
12,131701 |