Vista Equipo: Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders' contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996-2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales:	Gutiérrez, Luis H., Pombo, Carlos
Formato:	Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:	Inglés (English)
Publicado:	2009
Materias:	Colombian corporations Corporate control Corporate governance Firm value Multiple blockholders
Acceso en línea:	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22338 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2008.01.002

id	ir-10336-22338
recordtype	dspace
spelling	ir-10336-223382022-05-02T12:37:16Z Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia Gutiérrez, Luis H. Pombo, Carlos Colombian corporations Corporate control Corporate governance Firm value Multiple blockholders This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders' contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996-2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders' contestability. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 2009 2020-05-25T23:56:09Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion 1486195 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22338 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2008.01.002 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution	EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection	DSpace
language	Inglés (English)
topic	Colombian corporations Corporate control Corporate governance Firm value Multiple blockholders
spellingShingle	Colombian corporations Corporate control Corporate governance Firm value Multiple blockholders Gutiérrez, Luis H. Pombo, Carlos Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
description	This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders' contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996-2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders' contestability. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
format	Artículo (Article)
author	Gutiérrez, Luis H. Pombo, Carlos
author_facet	Gutiérrez, Luis H. Pombo, Carlos
author_sort	Gutiérrez, Luis H.
title	Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
title_short	Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
title_full	Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
title_fullStr	Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
title_full_unstemmed	Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia
title_sort	corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: the case of colombia
publishDate	2009
url	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22338 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2008.01.002
_version_	1740172934605963264
score	12,131701

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

Ejemplares similares