Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

"This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the sam...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Cremer, Helmuth, De Donder, Philippe, Maldonado, Dario, Pestieau, Pierre
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: 2008
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22182
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9031-2

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