Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine
In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic p...
Autor Principal: | |
---|---|
Formato: | Artículo (Article) |
Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
Publicado: |
Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
2019
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22170 https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0150-4 |
Sumario: | In this article, I shall demonstrate that several of the arguments made in favour of an offensive realist explanation of Russian actions in Ukraine as part of a power balancing process are inconsistent both with available empirical knowledge of the conflict in Ukraine and with the structural logic postulated by offensive realist theory itself. Rather than a conflict about power in a material sense, I will argue that the war in Ukraine is better understood as a conflict about the incompatibility of the Russian state structure to cope with the imperatives of functional differentiation as understood by theories of world society. © 2018, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature. |
---|