Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?

We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Condition...

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Autores Principales: Zuleta, Hernando, Villaveces, Marta Juanita, Andonova, Veneta
Formato: Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725
id ir-10336-18725
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-187252019-09-19T12:38:03Z Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful? Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces, Marta Juanita Andonova, Veneta Alto al fuego Colombia Conflicto Distribución Conflicto armado Negociación de conflictos Donaciones Cease-Fire Colombia Conflict Distribution We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Conditions are established under which a system of pre-donations may facilitate a truce. In particular, for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, whereby cease-fire is the best strategy for both of them. However, in many cases the conditions are not right for such a scheme of pre-donations to be effective. Some limitations of the framework are analyzed and the model is extended to deal with certain shortcomings in the basic setup. To illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results, we briefly describe the circumstances that have characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and various illegal groups in this long-lasting armed conflict. © 2013 The Authors. 2013 2018-11-21T19:38:57Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion ISSN 1053-5357 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Income distribution, political instability, and investment (1996) European Economic Review, 40 (6), pp. 1203-1228
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Alto al fuego
Colombia
Conflicto
Distribución
Conflicto armado
Negociación de conflictos
Donaciones
Cease-Fire
Colombia
Conflict
Distribution
spellingShingle Alto al fuego
Colombia
Conflicto
Distribución
Conflicto armado
Negociación de conflictos
Donaciones
Cease-Fire
Colombia
Conflict
Distribution
Zuleta, Hernando
Villaveces, Marta Juanita
Andonova, Veneta
Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
description We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Conditions are established under which a system of pre-donations may facilitate a truce. In particular, for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, whereby cease-fire is the best strategy for both of them. However, in many cases the conditions are not right for such a scheme of pre-donations to be effective. Some limitations of the framework are analyzed and the model is extended to deal with certain shortcomings in the basic setup. To illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results, we briefly describe the circumstances that have characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and various illegal groups in this long-lasting armed conflict. © 2013 The Authors.
format Artículo (Article)
author Zuleta, Hernando
Villaveces, Marta Juanita
Andonova, Veneta
author_facet Zuleta, Hernando
Villaveces, Marta Juanita
Andonova, Veneta
author_sort Zuleta, Hernando
title Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_short Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_full Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_fullStr Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_full_unstemmed Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_sort conflict and negotiation in colombia : are pre-donations useful?
publishDate 2013
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725
_version_ 1651341284670963712
score 11,373081