Vista Equipo: Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?

Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?

We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Condition...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales:	Zuleta, Hernando, Villaveces, Marta Juanita, Andonova, Veneta
Formato:	Artículo (Article)
Lenguaje:	Inglés (English)
Publicado:	2013
Materias:	Alto al fuego Colombia Conflicto Distribución Conflicto armado Negociación de conflictos Donaciones Cease-Fire Conflict Distribution
Acceso en línea:	http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725

id	ir-10336-18725
recordtype	dspace
spelling	ir-10336-187252019-09-19T12:38:03Z Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful? Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces, Marta Juanita Andonova, Veneta Alto al fuego Colombia Conflicto Distribución Conflicto armado Negociación de conflictos Donaciones Cease-Fire Colombia Conflict Distribution We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Conditions are established under which a system of pre-donations may facilitate a truce. In particular, for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, whereby cease-fire is the best strategy for both of them. However, in many cases the conditions are not right for such a scheme of pre-donations to be effective. Some limitations of the framework are analyzed and the model is extended to deal with certain shortcomings in the basic setup. To illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results, we briefly describe the circumstances that have characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and various illegal groups in this long-lasting armed conflict. © 2013 The Authors. 2013 2018-11-21T19:38:57Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion ISSN 1053-5357 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Income distribution, political instability, and investment (1996) European Economic Review, 40 (6), pp. 1203-1228
institution	EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection	DSpace
language	Inglés (English)
topic	Alto al fuego Colombia Conflicto Distribución Conflicto armado Negociación de conflictos Donaciones Cease-Fire Colombia Conflict Distribution
spellingShingle	Alto al fuego Colombia Conflicto Distribución Conflicto armado Negociación de conflictos Donaciones Cease-Fire Colombia Conflict Distribution Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces, Marta Juanita Andonova, Veneta Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
description	We model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Conditions are established under which a system of pre-donations may facilitate a truce. In particular, for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, whereby cease-fire is the best strategy for both of them. However, in many cases the conditions are not right for such a scheme of pre-donations to be effective. Some limitations of the framework are analyzed and the model is extended to deal with certain shortcomings in the basic setup. To illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results, we briefly describe the circumstances that have characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and various illegal groups in this long-lasting armed conflict. © 2013 The Authors.
format	Artículo (Article)
author	Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces, Marta Juanita Andonova, Veneta
author_facet	Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces, Marta Juanita Andonova, Veneta
author_sort	Zuleta, Hernando
title	Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_short	Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_full	Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_fullStr	Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_full_unstemmed	Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?
title_sort	conflict and negotiation in colombia : are pre-donations useful?
publishDate	2013
url	http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725
_version_	1651341284670963712
score	11,373081

Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?

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