Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment

We study whether overconfidence affects the choice over contracts in a real-effort task by using three different measures of overconfidence: miscalibration, illusion of control, and overplacement. We find that overplacement, which is the only measure related to the task, has a significant effect on...

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Autor Principal: Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo
Otros Colaboradores: Kayi, Cagatay
Formato: Tesis de maestría (Master Thesis)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18309
id ir-10336-18309
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-183092019-09-19T12:37:54Z Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo Kayi, Cagatay Blanco, Mariana Overconfidence Contracts Real-Effort task Administración pública Contratos Modelos econométricos We study whether overconfidence affects the choice over contracts in a real-effort task by using three different measures of overconfidence: miscalibration, illusion of control, and overplacement. We find that overplacement, which is the only measure related to the task, has a significant effect on the choice over contracts. Our design also allows us to observe overconfidence measures at different moments of time. We find that more (less) overconfident subjects remain as more less) overconfident over time. 2018-08-09 2018-08-17T20:13:26Z info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18309 spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Maestría en Economía Facultad de Economía reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Overconfidence
Contracts
Real-Effort task
Administración pública
Contratos
Modelos econométricos
spellingShingle Overconfidence
Contracts
Real-Effort task
Administración pública
Contratos
Modelos econométricos
Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo
Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
description We study whether overconfidence affects the choice over contracts in a real-effort task by using three different measures of overconfidence: miscalibration, illusion of control, and overplacement. We find that overplacement, which is the only measure related to the task, has a significant effect on the choice over contracts. Our design also allows us to observe overconfidence measures at different moments of time. We find that more (less) overconfident subjects remain as more less) overconfident over time.
author2 Kayi, Cagatay
author_facet Kayi, Cagatay
Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo
format Tesis de maestría (Master Thesis)
author Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo
author_sort Gómez Vásquez, Daniel Camilo
title Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
title_short Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
title_full Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
title_fullStr Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
title_full_unstemmed Overconfidence and Contracts : An Experiment
title_sort overconfidence and contracts : an experiment
publisher Universidad del Rosario
publishDate 2018
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18309
_version_ 1645140825751945216
score 12,139156