Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency

I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the...

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Autor Principal: Roig, Guillem
Otros Autores: Facultad de Economía
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Inglés (English)
Publicado: 2017
Materias:
D44
L11
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161
id ir-10336-14161
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-141612019-09-19T12:37:01Z Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency Roig, Guillem Facultad de Economía Inversión bilaterales Contratos no exclusivos Competencia Economía financiera Inversiones privadas Contratos comerciales Proveedores Negociación Bilateral Investment Hold-up Non-Exclusive Contracts Competition D44 L11 I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the investment costs. The investment of the supplier does not affect its bargaining position, and both the supplier and the buyer have the right incentives to invest. In any other equilibria, the efficient investment is not implemented: the reallocation of bargaining power as a result of investment distorts the incentives to invest efficiently. However, because under some parameters of the model investment decisions are strategic complements welfare is maximised for an intermediate level of competition. 2017-12-07 2017-12-12T19:06:12Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Inglés (English)
topic Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
D44
L11
spellingShingle Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
D44
L11
Roig, Guillem
Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
description I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the investment costs. The investment of the supplier does not affect its bargaining position, and both the supplier and the buyer have the right incentives to invest. In any other equilibria, the efficient investment is not implemented: the reallocation of bargaining power as a result of investment distorts the incentives to invest efficiently. However, because under some parameters of the model investment decisions are strategic complements welfare is maximised for an intermediate level of competition.
author2 Facultad de Economía
author_facet Facultad de Economía
Roig, Guillem
format Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
author Roig, Guillem
author_sort Roig, Guillem
title Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_short Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_full Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_fullStr Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_full_unstemmed Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_sort bilateral investment in a delegated common agency
publishDate 2017
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161
_version_ 1645141994015555584
score 11,489418