School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresp...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Jaramillo, Paula, Kayi, Cagatay, Klijn, Flip
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2017
Materias:
C78
D61
D78
I20
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13235

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