Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems

This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study the assortativeness of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores Principales: Jaramillo, Paula, Kayi, Cagatay, Klijn, Flip
Otros Autores: Grupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2017
Materias:
C78
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13229
Descripción
Sumario:This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study the assortativeness of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight.