Congress composition and electoral advantage
In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the re...
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| Formato: | Tesis de maestría (Master Thesis) |
| Lenguaje: | Español (Spanish) |
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Universidad del Rosario
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11969 |
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ir-10336-11969 |
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EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
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| language |
Español (Spanish) |
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Colombia Senado Senadores Reforma política Cuota de Hare Regresión discontinua Comportamiento legislativo El proceso político Reforma política -- Colombia -- 2003 Sistema de partidos Partidos políticos -- Legislación -- Colombia Colombia -- Congreso nacional Colombia Senate Senators Political reform Hare quota Legislative behavior Regression discontinuity |
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Colombia Senado Senadores Reforma política Cuota de Hare Regresión discontinua Comportamiento legislativo El proceso político Reforma política -- Colombia -- 2003 Sistema de partidos Partidos políticos -- Legislación -- Colombia Colombia -- Congreso nacional Colombia Senate Senators Political reform Hare quota Legislative behavior Regression discontinuity Angulo Santacruz, Juan Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| description |
In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage. |
| author2 |
Vargas, Juan F. |
| author_facet |
Vargas, Juan F. Angulo Santacruz, Juan |
| format |
Tesis de maestría (Master Thesis) |
| author |
Angulo Santacruz, Juan |
| author_sort |
Angulo Santacruz, Juan |
| title |
Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| title_short |
Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| title_full |
Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| title_fullStr |
Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Congress composition and electoral advantage |
| title_sort |
congress composition and electoral advantage |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11969 |
| _version_ |
1645141882522566656 |
| spelling |
ir-10336-119692019-09-19T12:37:54Z Congress composition and electoral advantage Angulo Santacruz, Juan Vargas, Juan F. Colombia Senado Senadores Reforma política Cuota de Hare Regresión discontinua Comportamiento legislativo El proceso político Reforma política -- Colombia -- 2003 Sistema de partidos Partidos políticos -- Legislación -- Colombia Colombia -- Congreso nacional Colombia Senate Senators Political reform Hare quota Legislative behavior Regression discontinuity In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage. 2015-12-09 2016-05-04T20:22:40Z info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11969 spa http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Maestría en Economía Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos (2013) The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(s1): 5-44, January. Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 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Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(2): 281-355, June. Pachón, Mónica, and Fabio Sánchez (2014) Base de datos sobre resultados electorales CEDE, 1958 --2011. Universidad de los Andes, Serie Documentos CEDE 2014-29, agosto. Hoskin, Gary, Francisco Leal, Harvey Kline, Dora Röthlisberger, and Armando Borrero (2011) Un estudio del Congreso colombiano. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales (CEDO), Universidad de los Andes, Ediciones Uniandes, Bogotá, octubre. Pachón, Mónica, and Matthew S. Shugart (2010) Electoral reform and the mirror image of inter-party and intra-party competition: The adoption of party lists in Colombia. Electoral Studies, Elsevier, vol. 29(4): 648-660, December. Plata, Juan Camilo (2011) Buscar la reelección en 2010: el efecto de la efectividad legislativa. Colombia Internacional, vol. 74: 153-172, julio-diciembre. Quiroga, Daniel, Felipe Jacobo, and Paola Camacho (2013) ¿Cómo juzgamos a nuestros congresistas? On-line article from www.congresovisible.org, available at http://congresovisible.org/agora/post/como-juzgamos-a-nuestros-congresistas/5051/ Redmond, Paul, and John Regan (2015) Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 38: 244-256, June. Róbles, Francisco (1995) Formulas electorales, proporcionalidad y bipartidismo modificado: los casos de Colombia y Venezuela. Papel Político No 2, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia, pp. 45-62, octubre. Durán, María Camila (2006) La reforma política de 2003: ¿Más de lo mismo? Papel Político Estudiantil, Bogotá (Colombia), vol. 2(1): 113-135, enero-junio. Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos (2001) ¿Cambiar todo para que nada cambie? Representación, sistema electoral y sistema de partido en Colombia: capacidad de adaptación de las élites políticas a cambios en el entorno institucional. En Francisco Gutiérrez (compilador), Degradación o cambio: Evolución del sistema político colombiano, Bogotá: Grupo editorial Norma, pp. 79-130, junio. Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos, and Felipe Botero (2006) Ordenando el caos: Elecciones legislativas y reforma electoral en Colombia. Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago), Santiago, Chile, vol. 26(1): 138-151. Roland, Gérard, and Juan Gonzalo Zapata (2005) Colombia's Electoral and Party System: Possible Paths for Reform. In Alberto Alesina (editor), Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 103-130, January. |
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12,131701 |