Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care netwo...

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Autores Principales: Bardey, David, Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11120
id ir-10336-11120
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-111202019-09-19T12:37:01Z Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare Bardey, David Bourgeon, Jean-Marc Problemas & servicios de bienestar social Seguridad social Seguros Salud pública Atención médica Política social Health Care Network Horizontal Differentiation Health Care Quality We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers. 2010 2015-10-15T12:08:16Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11120 Universidad del Rosario spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Problemas & servicios de bienestar social
Seguridad social
Seguros
Salud pública
Atención médica
Política social
Health Care Network
Horizontal Differentiation
Health Care Quality
spellingShingle Problemas & servicios de bienestar social
Seguridad social
Seguros
Salud pública
Atención médica
Política social
Health Care Network
Horizontal Differentiation
Health Care Quality
Bardey, David
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
description We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.
format Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
author Bardey, David
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
author_facet Bardey, David
Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
author_sort Bardey, David
title Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
title_short Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
title_full Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
title_fullStr Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
title_full_unstemmed Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
title_sort health care network formation and policyholders' welfare
publisher Universidad del Rosario
publishDate 2010
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11120
_version_ 1645142441568763904
score 11,365454