Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to re...

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Autores Principales: Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber, Vargas, Juan F.
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10999
id ir-10336-10999
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-109992019-09-19T12:37:01Z Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber Vargas, Juan F. Sociología & antropología Conflicto armado::Condiciones Sociales Conflicto armado -- Crítica e interpretación -- Colombia Conflicto armado -- investigaciones Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies. 2015-09 2015-10-11T15:37:32Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10999 spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Sociología & antropología
Conflicto armado::Condiciones Sociales
Conflicto armado -- Crítica e interpretación -- Colombia
Conflicto armado -- investigaciones
spellingShingle Sociología & antropología
Conflicto armado::Condiciones Sociales
Conflicto armado -- Crítica e interpretación -- Colombia
Conflicto armado -- investigaciones
Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber
Vargas, Juan F.
Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
description Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.
format Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
author Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber
Vargas, Juan F.
author_facet Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber
Vargas, Juan F.
author_sort Mahmud, Ahmed-Saber
title Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
title_short Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
title_full Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
title_fullStr Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
title_full_unstemmed Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
title_sort combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
publisher Universidad del Rosario
publishDate 2015
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10999
_version_ 1645141110224322560
score 12,131701