Information provision in procurement auctions
We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid co...
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| Formato: | Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
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Universidad del Rosario
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997 |
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ir-10336-109972019-09-19T12:38:03Z Information provision in procurement auctions Coleff, Joaquín García, Daniel Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante. 2013 2015-10-09T20:34:55Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997 Universidad del Rosario eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
Inglés (English) |
| topic |
Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios |
| spellingShingle |
Producción Economía Contratos::Aspectos Económicos Oferta y demanda Información::Aspectos Económicos Política de precios Coleff, Joaquín García, Daniel Information provision in procurement auctions |
| description |
We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante. |
| format |
Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| author |
Coleff, Joaquín García, Daniel |
| author_facet |
Coleff, Joaquín García, Daniel |
| author_sort |
Coleff, Joaquín |
| title |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
| title_short |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
| title_full |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
| title_fullStr |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Information provision in procurement auctions |
| title_sort |
information provision in procurement auctions |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997 |
| _version_ |
1651341282397650944 |
| score |
12,111491 |