Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach
We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transf...
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| Formato: | Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| Lenguaje: | Español (Spanish) |
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Universidad del Rosario
2008
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10963 |
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ir-10336-109632019-09-19T12:37:01Z Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita Economía Solución de conflictos::Modelos Matemáticos Teoría de los juegos Economía::Modelos Matemáticos Conflict Distribution Cease-Fire Colombia We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups. 2008-11 2015-10-05T15:29:23Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10963 Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
| collection |
DSpace |
| language |
Español (Spanish) |
| topic |
Economía Solución de conflictos::Modelos Matemáticos Teoría de los juegos Economía::Modelos Matemáticos Conflict Distribution Cease-Fire Colombia |
| spellingShingle |
Economía Solución de conflictos::Modelos Matemáticos Teoría de los juegos Economía::Modelos Matemáticos Conflict Distribution Cease-Fire Colombia Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| description |
We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups. |
| format |
Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| author |
Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita |
| author_facet |
Zuleta, Hernando Villaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita |
| author_sort |
Zuleta, Hernando |
| title |
Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| title_short |
Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| title_full |
Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| title_fullStr |
Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| title_sort |
conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2008 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10963 |
| _version_ |
1645141573259755520 |
| score |
12,131701 |