Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies
Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidat...
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| Formato: | Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| Lenguaje: | Español (Spanish) |
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Universidad del Rosario
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10948 |
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ir-10336-109482019-09-19T12:37:01Z Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Vargas, Juan F. Vela, Mauricio Derechos civiles & políticos Ciencia política Delitos políticos Medios de comunicación de masas Conducta política Partidos políticos::Responsabilidad Social Media, Democracy Elections Colombia Civil Conflict Coercion Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the ‘parapolitics’ scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our re 2013 2015-10-02T15:55:12Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10948 Universidad del Rosario spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario |
| institution |
EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
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DSpace |
| language |
Español (Spanish) |
| topic |
Derechos civiles & políticos Ciencia política Delitos políticos Medios de comunicación de masas Conducta política Partidos políticos::Responsabilidad Social Media, Democracy Elections Colombia Civil Conflict Coercion |
| spellingShingle |
Derechos civiles & políticos Ciencia política Delitos políticos Medios de comunicación de masas Conducta política Partidos políticos::Responsabilidad Social Media, Democracy Elections Colombia Civil Conflict Coercion Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Vargas, Juan F. Vela, Mauricio Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| description |
Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the ‘parapolitics’ scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our re |
| format |
Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| author |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Vargas, Juan F. Vela, Mauricio |
| author_facet |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo Vargas, Juan F. Vela, Mauricio |
| author_sort |
Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo |
| title |
Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| title_short |
Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| title_full |
Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| title_fullStr |
Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Sunlight disinfects? Free media in weak democracies |
| title_sort |
sunlight disinfects? free media in weak democracies |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10948 |
| _version_ |
1645141956632772608 |
| score |
12,131701 |