Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria
Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a gue...
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| Formato: | Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés (English) |
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Universidad del Rosario
2006
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| Acceso en línea: | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10843 |
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EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario |
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Inglés (English) |
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Economía laboral Desarrollo económico Salarios Economía laboral Distribución de la riqueza Pobreza::Aspectos Económicos conflict efficiency wages general equilibrium income distribution multiple equilibria |
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Economía laboral Desarrollo económico Salarios Economía laboral Distribución de la riqueza Pobreza::Aspectos Económicos conflict efficiency wages general equilibrium income distribution multiple equilibria Zuleta, Hernando Andonova, Veneta Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| description |
Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem. |
| format |
Documento de trabajo (Working Paper) |
| author |
Zuleta, Hernando Andonova, Veneta |
| author_facet |
Zuleta, Hernando Andonova, Veneta |
| author_sort |
Zuleta, Hernando |
| title |
Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| title_short |
Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| title_full |
Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| title_fullStr |
Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| title_sort |
conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria |
| publisher |
Universidad del Rosario |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| url |
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10843 |
| _version_ |
1645141227004231680 |
| spelling |
ir-10336-108432019-09-19T12:37:01Z Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria Zuleta, Hernando Andonova, Veneta Economía laboral Desarrollo económico Salarios Economía laboral Distribución de la riqueza Pobreza::Aspectos Económicos conflict efficiency wages general equilibrium income distribution multiple equilibria Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem. 2006 2015-09-21T15:04:58Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Zuleta, H., & Andonova, V. (2006). Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario. http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10843 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario Andonova, V. and Zuleta, H., The Effect of Legal Enforcement on Human Resource Practices: A Case study in Rural Colombia, International Journal of Manpower (forthcoming) Azam, Jean-Paul, Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1), (2002), 131-153. Burgoon, Brian, On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(2), (2006), 176-203. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., On economic causes of civil war Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 4 (1998), 563-573 . Diaz, A., On the Political Economy of Latin American Land Reforms, Review of Economic Dynamics 3, (2000), 551-71. Echandía, C., La Guerrilla Colombiana: Condiciones Objetivas y Estrategias de una Expansión, Revue de Problémes dÁmérique Latine 34, (1999) Paris, Nouvelle Série juilletseptembre. Elvira, M. and Davila, A. Culture and Human Resource Management in Latin America, in Davila, A. and Elvira, M. (Eds.), Managing Human Resources in Latin America, Oxford, UK: Routledge Publishers, (2005). Freeman, R., Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, (1996), 25-42. Grossman, H.I., A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections, American Economic Review 81, (1991), 912-921. Grossman, H. I., The Creation of Effective Property Rights, American Economic Review 91, (2001), 347-352. Krohn, M. D., Inequality Unemployment and Crime: A Cross-National Analysis The Sociological Quarterly 17, (1976), 303- Montaño, L., Las nuevas relaciones humanas: Un falso reto a la democracia, in Ibarra, E. and Montaño, L. (Eds.), Ensayos Críticos para el Estudio de las Organizaciones en México, Mexico: UAM-I, Miguel Angel Porrúa, (1991). Myers, S.L., Do Better Wages Reduce Crime? A Research Note, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 43, (1984), 191- Rodríguez, F.C., Inequality, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Economic and Politics 16, (2004), 287-320. Roemer, J.E., Why the Poor do Not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in a New Garb, Journal of Public Economics 70, (1998), 399-424. Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J.E., Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, American Economic Review 74, (1984), 433-444. Skaperdas, S., Cooperation, Conflict and Power in the Absence of Property Rights, American Economic Review 82, (1992), 720-739. Skaperdas, S. and Syropoulos C., Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities, Economica 64, (1997), 101-117. Velez, C. Leibovich, Kugler, Buillon y Nuñez. The Reversal of Inequality Gains in Colombia 1978-1995: A Combination of Persistent and Fluctuating Forces. Seminario de Economía de la Cátedra Colombia. (2000) Zuleta, H., Persistence and Expansion of Guerrilla Activities: The Case of Colombia, Journal of Income Distribution 13, (2004), 105-116. |
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12,131701 |