Rebellion, repression and welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Vargas, Juan F.
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10839
id ir-10336-10839
recordtype dspace
spelling ir-10336-108392019-09-19T12:37:01Z Rebellion, repression and welfare Vargas, Juan F. Procesos sociales Violencia política Pobreza Solución de conflictos Rebellion Repression Inequality Markov Perfect Equilibrium I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society. 2010-04 2015-09-19T18:47:55Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10839 spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Procesos sociales
Violencia política
Pobreza
Solución de conflictos
Rebellion
Repression
Inequality
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
spellingShingle Procesos sociales
Violencia política
Pobreza
Solución de conflictos
Rebellion
Repression
Inequality
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Vargas, Juan F.
Rebellion, repression and welfare
description I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.
format Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
author Vargas, Juan F.
author_facet Vargas, Juan F.
author_sort Vargas, Juan F.
title Rebellion, repression and welfare
title_short Rebellion, repression and welfare
title_full Rebellion, repression and welfare
title_fullStr Rebellion, repression and welfare
title_full_unstemmed Rebellion, repression and welfare
title_sort rebellion, repression and welfare
publisher Universidad del Rosario
publishDate 2010
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10839
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score 11,366519