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Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Gallego, Jorge A.
Formato: Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
Lenguaje:Español (Spanish)
Publicado: Universidad del Rosario 2015
Materias:
Otros problemas & servicios sociales
Elecciones::Colombia
Corrupción política
Corrupción administrativa
Desastres naturales::Colombia
Acceso en línea:http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10819
id ir-10336-10819
recordtype dspace
institution EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
collection DSpace
language Español (Spanish)
topic Otros problemas & servicios sociales
Elecciones::Colombia
Corrupción política
Corrupción administrativa
Desastres naturales::Colombia
spellingShingle Otros problemas & servicios sociales
Elecciones::Colombia
Corrupción política
Corrupción administrativa
Desastres naturales::Colombia
Gallego, Jorge A.
Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
description What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.
format Documento de trabajo (Working Paper)
author Gallego, Jorge A.
author_facet Gallego, Jorge A.
author_sort Gallego, Jorge A.
title Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
title_short Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
title_full Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
title_fullStr Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
title_full_unstemmed Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia
title_sort natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in colombia
publisher Universidad del Rosario
publishDate 2015
url http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10819
_version_ 1712098507897176064
spelling ir-10336-108192021-08-29T23:05:30Z Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia Gallego, Jorge A. Otros problemas & servicios sociales Elecciones::Colombia Corrupción política Corrupción administrativa Desastres naturales::Colombia What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper. 2015-02 2015-09-17T21:02:06Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Jorge Andrés, G. D. (2015). Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía. http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10819 Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía spa info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf Universidad del Rosario Facultad de Economía instname:Universidad del Rosario reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR instname:Universidad del Rosario Abney, G. and Hill, L. (1966). Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on an Urban Election, American Political Science Review 60(4): 974–981. Achen, C. and Bartels, L. (2004). Blind Retrospection Electoral Response to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks, Working Paper, Princeton University. Anbarci, N., Escaleras, M. and Register, C. (2005). Earthquakes Fatalities: the Interaction of Nature and Political Economy, Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10): 1907–1933. Chen, J. (2011). Voter Income and Mobilizing Effect of Distributive Benefits, Working Paper, University of Michigan. Chen, J. (forthcoming). Distributive Spending, Voter Partisanship, and Political Participation: A Theory of Voter Turnout as Retrospective Evaluation, American Journal of Political Science . Escaleras, M., Anbarci, N. and Register, C. (2007). Public Sector Corruption and Major Earthquakes: A Potentially Deadly Interaction, Public Choice 132(1-2): 209–230. Fair, C., Kuhn, P., Malhotra, N. and Shapiro, J. (2014). Economic Shocks and Civic Engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistani Floods, Working Paper. Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 30: 5–25. Gallego, J. (2011). Civil Conflict and Voting Behavior: Evidence from Colombia, Working Paper, New York University. Gallego, J. (2014). Self-enforcing clientelism, Journal of Theoretical Politics, doi: 10.1177/0951629814533840 . Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2009). Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy, American Political Science Review 103(3): 387–406. IDEAM (1998). Estudio Nacional del Agua, Instituto de Hidrologia, Meteorologia y Estudios Ambientales. Kahn, M. (2005). The Death Tolls from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and Institutions, Review of Economics and Statistics 87(2): 271–284. Miguel, E., Satyanath, S. and Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach, Journal of Political Economy 112(4): 725–753. Mustafa, D. (2003). Reinforcing Vulnerability? Disaster Relief, Recovery, and Response to the 2001 Flood in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, Environmental Hazards 5(3-4): 71–82. Quiroz, A. and Smith, A. (2010). Surviving Disasters, Working Paper, New York University. Sanchez, A. (2011). Despues de la inundacion, Documento de trabajo sobre economia regional No. 150, Banco de la Republica Stromberg, D. (2007). Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3): 199–222. Uppal, Y. (2009). Estimating Incumbency Effects in U.S. State Legislatures: A Quasi-Experimental Study, Public Choice 138: 9–27.
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